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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Aim of the research described here is to analyse the effects of a new regulative 
environment for public transport in the Netherlands as of January 2002. This environment 
is laid down in the Passenger Transport Law 2000. The subject in this Law is public 
transport in regional areas, in small and medium sized cities en in the four main four 
conurbation’s.  
 
In chapter 2 the organisational structure of the public transport sector in the Netherlands is 
positioned. Chapter 3 contains a quantitative background of the sector. Tendering and the 
effects of tendering are the subjects of respectively chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6 has 
market access as subject. The paper is finalised by some conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
2 THE REGULATIVE SETTING OF THE PUBLIC TRANSPORT SECTOR 
2.1 The Players 
Since 2001 policy on public transport in the Netherlands is decentralised. The responsibility 
now rests with 19 Public Transport Authorities (PTA’s): 12 Provinces and 7 conurbation’s. 
Out of these 7, in four big conurbation’s the PTA own the transit company (municipal 
companies, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht). Other companies operate in the 
smaller cities and the rural areas. Connexxion is the market leader in this group. Since the 
opening of the market in 2001 a number of foreign companies have acquired formerly 
Dutch owned companies. For instance the northern companies GVB-Groningen, and GADO 
were acquired by Arriva, and the southern companies SBM and BBA are now in possession 
of Connex.  
 
The policy of Dutch Government is aimed at enforcing competition via public tendering. For 
that case the monopoly of the former state owned VSN-group had to be broken down, 
since that company had a dominant market position. Before competition could take place 
the VSN-group had to be dismantled. VNS therefore was split up in VSN-1 and a VSN-2. 
According to an article in the Passenger Transport Law 2000 (see section 2.2), excessive 
market power is prohibited. A maximum of 50% market share was laid out as standard. 
VSN-1 was composed out of the former rural companies NZH, ZWN, Oostnet and Midnet. 
VSN-1 later on is restructured and renamed Connexxion Holding. VSN-2 was intended to 
be a temporary holding. It consisted of the companies. VEONN, BBA en Hermes. These 
companies were supposed to be sold externally. VEONN was sold to Arriva (UK) , BBA to 
Connex (France). The latest plans concerning Hermes are that it is probably again taken 
back in the Connexxion Holding.  
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2.2 The Passengers Transport Law 2000 
The Transport Law of 2000 sets for regional and municipal public transport a twofold goal: 
 a selective and regional differentiated growth in public transport patronage 
 a substantial improvement of the cost recovery ratio, to at least 50%  
One of the instruments Government uses to reach these goals is introduction of 
competition. This is also imposed by the EU. The format of competition chosen in the Law 
is temporarily (once in 6 years) contestability of concessions. These concessions are 
tendered by the competent authorities, i.e. the Provinces and conurbation’s. Once a 
operator has acquired a concession, it gives the right to operate public transport in that 
concession area for the designated period of time. 
 
Expectations behind introducing this new legislation are that the thread of competition 
stimulates operators to act more customer oriented and by this means produce public 
transport more efficiently and effectively. Competition would further lead to more 
innovation, freedom of choice for customers and PTA's and enhance entrepreneurial 
behaviour. 
 
An important part of the Law is decentralisation of the responsibilities to regional 
authorities (PTA’s). The PTA’s receive subsidies from the State and put these through to 
the operators.  
 
Rail transport (both regional and national) is not under jurisdiction of the Law 2000. The 
concession for the national train services is granted until 2012 (without tendering) to 
Dutch Railways. It is not clear at the moment what will be the situation for the regional 
train services.  
 
 
2.2.1 Regional Public Transport  
The Law provided for phased introduction of competition by tendering concessions. 
Intended was that –spread over the nation- by the beginning of 2004 35% of the 
contestable turn over for the regional market was tendered. January 1st 2006 all regional 
concessions had to be tendered. 
The results of a mid term evaluation of the actions and effects (Berenschot, 2004) brought 
Government to the opinion that tendering is a good instrument and should be obliged, 
however the original time path was judged too optimistic. Government now proposes that 
as from January 1st 2007 all regional and small city public transport in the Netherlands 
must publicly tendered.  
The intentions of Government (Kabinetsstandpunt, 2004) will be discussed in Parliament in 
September 2005.  
 
 
2.2.2 Municipal public transport 
We define the regional market as the market outside the four main municipalities 
(Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht). These four cities exercise specific 
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features that make it necessary to distinguish them in the research work at hand. Public 
transport in each of these cities is supplied by a municipal (publicly owned ) company. 
Other peculiarities are: 
• rail infrastructure: without exemption, public transport in the four big cities is 
characterised by mixed exploitation of bus, tram and metro. Issues with respect to 
infrastructure are i.a. strategic ownership, barriers to market entrance, complex 
situation of rolling stock 
• integrated complex networks (synergy between bus and rail) 
• high level of investments in infrastructure and rolling stock  
Because of this complexity an exemption for obliged tendering as from January 1st 2007 is 
made by the Minister. For the municipal concessions the policy intentions of the Minister 
are now: 
• tendering will be obliged 
• privatisation or at least administrative independence from the municipality before 
January 1st 2007 
• tendering of the municipal bus concessions before January 1st 2009 
• tendering of the municipal rail concessions before January 1st 2017 
In the meanwhile the municipal companies are not allowed to tender in other concessions 
(reciprocity). 
 
In response to reactions from the parliament, the Minster allows some variability. For 
municipalities (such as Amsterdam) who wish to tender combined bus and rail concessions 
as one integral package, the Minister is willing to extend the term of obligation of tendering 
till January 1st 2012 under the strict condition that at that moment in time the whole 
package of bus, tram and metro concessions is put contestable.  
 
3 SOME BACKGROUND FIGURES OF THE SECTOR 
To give the reader some background information, in this chapter the public transport sector 
is described.  
The research in this paper is aimed to public transport in rural and urban concession areas. 
The modalities concerned in these areas are Bus, Tram and Metro (BTM). These modalities 
are the research object of the authors and form the delineation of this paper.  
 
The administrative structure of the public transport sector is based on concession areas. 
Holland is divided in 74 concession areas. There are 19 competent authorities who are 
responsible for these concessions. The modalities concerned are: 
1. bus municipal 
2. bus non municipal 
3. tram 
4. metro 
5. regional (decentralised) train 
6. national train 
 
The object of our research and thus for this paper are the first 4 categories of modalities. 
In illustration 1 the estimated turnover (sales) is rendered (Ecorys, 2004) 
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Illustration 1, Public Transport market in the Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Modal split 
 
Reference is given with respect to the developments of public transport in the Netherlands 
in the past couple of years. The trend for public transport is negative. Not only is BTM-use 
declining, but because of the increasing use of the car and bicycle, the share of public 
transport is rapidly decreasing from 4.1% in 2001 to 3.5% in 2003. 
 
Table 1, Performance public transport sector 2003 (Kabinetstandpunt,2004) 
passenger kilometres per year 
 billion share 
car driver 92,9 48,7% 
car passenger 53,2 27,9% 
train 14,5 7,6% 
bus/tram/metro 6,6 3,5% 
moped 0,9 0,5% 
bike 13,9 7,3% 
walk 3,9 2,0% 
rest 5,1 2,7% 
Netherlands 190,9 100,0% 
 
There are a couple of obvious reasons for the declining trend in public transport patronage: 
• increase in car use and car ownership,  
• decrease in public transport supply due to subsidy cuts,  
• increase in use of bicycle due to favourable weather conditions  
• increase in public transport-fares  
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3.2 Performance BTM 
BTM is the primary focus of this paper. In this section the sector is positioned. 
In table 2 some performance indicators of BTM are shown. 
 
 
Table 2, BTM performance  
 
pass. km's 
 
 
 
% 
revenue 
 
 
 
% 
revenue
/pkm 
 
 
% 
vehicle 
hrs/wk 
 
 
% 
2001 4.792.319.919 100 506.409.408 100 0,106 100 missing  
2002 4.200.921.714 87,66% 521.869.070 103,05% 0,124 117,56% 303.461 100 
2003 4.289.607.954 89,51% 530.722.539 104,80% 0,124 117,08% 319.016 105,13%
2004 4.176.963.643 87,16% 540.661.386 106,76% 0,129 122,49% 314.128 103,52%
 
BTM Passenger kilometres (demand) over time is decreasing while revenue is increasing. 
This is caused by severe fare increases.  
 
The decrease in BTM use is not evenly spread. As can be seen in table 3, the dense urban 
areas were able to increase patronage.  
 
 
Table 3, Urban density and BTM supply and demand 
 vehicle hours BTM (%) passenger km’s BTM, 2001-2003 (%) 
 density 
>2000 
inh/km2 
density 
<1000-
2000> 
inh/km2 
density 
<1000 
inh/km2 
density 
>2000 
inh/km2 
density <1000-
2000> inh/km2 
density 
<1000 
inh/km2 
2001    100 100 100 
2002 100 100 100 90.38% 62.57% 93.89% 
2003 100.89% 104.16% 108.48% 94.59% 63.76% 94.01% 
2004 98.94% 103.13% 106.93% 97.90% 52.69% 89.94% 
 
Illustration 2, Impact of urban density, passenger kilometres and vehicle hours 
 
The number of passenger kilometres in the highly urbanised areas (more than 2,000 
inhabitants per Sq. km area) is rather stable. 9 out of the 71 investigated cases are defined 
as high density, 14 as medium dense (1,000-2,000 inhabitants per Sq. km) and 48 areas 
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have a rather low urban density (< 1,000 inh./Sq. km). Especially the number of 
passenger km’s in the medium and low density areas/concessions is decreasing over time.  
The BTM supply (expressed in vehicle hours per week) shows a different trend. BTM 
supply stays constant or even increases over time in all types of areas.  
 
Another useful differentiation is between municipal and non municipal settings. We define 
municipal as BTM in the four main conurbation’s (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and 
Utrecht).  
  7 
Table 4, Municipal companies perform better. 
Municipal companies pass.km's revenue revenue/pkm veh.hrs. 
2001 111,0% 94,0% 85,0% missing 
2002 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
2003 105,0% 106,0% 101,0% 98,0% 
2004 109,0% 112,0% 103,0% 96,0% 
     
     
Non-municipal 
companies pass.km's revenue revenue/pkm veh.hrs. 
2001 116,0% 100,0% 86,0% missing 
2002 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
2003 100,0% 98,0% 98,0% 109,0% 
2004 94,0% 96,0% 103,0% 107,0% 
 
The four main municipalities who own their operator has suffered a severe cut in budget 
that leave them no alternative than to cut supply (vehicle hours). Despite and contrary of 
reduction in supply, demand and revenue in the cities developed favourable.  
 
3.3 Efficiency 
The finding of falling demand and increasing supply lead to the conclusion that the 
efficiency of BTM in the Netherlands must have declined over time. Table 4 shows that 
this is indeed the case. We define efficiency as the number of passenger kilometres per 
vehicle hour. Conspicuous is that the decrease in efficiency over time occurs mainly in the 
medium and low dense areas. 
 
Table 5, Impact of urban density on efficiency 
 efficiency (number of pass.km’s/veh. hour) 
 high medium low  
2001 (missing) (missing) (missing) (missing) 
2002 304,97 208,34 277,09 276,9 
2003 316,38 203,81 255,76 268,9 
2004 333,87 170,08 248,20 265,9 
 
In appendix 1 efficiency performance figures for all the companies that operated in 2004 
are included. The efficiency by type of operator is given in table 6. 
 
Table 6, Efficiency per type of operator 
Efficiency 2002 2003 2004 
 
Connexxion group 276,8 264,5 246,5 
Municipal companies 322,3 345,3 365,4 
others  215,7 192,8 187,2 
 
Efficiency between companies fluctuates significantly (appendix 1). The rural companies 
have more or less the same efficiency (outliers caused by data imperfections). The 
municipal companies and especially RET and GVB-A produce very efficiently. The 
occupation of the vehicles in the cities is very high. The GVU and the former small urban 
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companies SVD and SBM produce relative inefficient. Compared to her close competitors 
Arriva and Connex, the state owned Conexxion-holding produces rather efficiently.  
Over time efficiency in the Connexxion-group companies is declining. Has this something 
to do with the tendering of concession? In the next chapter we will elaborate on this.  
 
 
3.4 Assessment of quality perceived  
 
Table 7 shows the average quality assessment of passengers. These figures are 
aggregates of some 80.000 individual surveys. The Klantenbarometer survey is held every 
November since 2001. Due to a different survey method of on the one hand surveys 
2001-2003 and on the other hand survey 2004, it is possible that variation in outcomes 
between these samples are not random.  
 
The decline in quality assessment in 2002 compared to 2001 and the increase in 2003 and 
2004 appears at most of the companies. A positive exception is MTI. This small company 
did put a whole new service concept in the market. Passengers were involved themselves 
with planning and scheduling. The concept was based on close proximity, so walking 
distances to destinations were small. Small busses operate on fixed routes but without 
fixed stops. Passenger can board and get out of the busses anywhere. MTI is similar to the 
Turkish dolmus concept. This newcomer on the market is valued high by customers. 
Unfortunately the business concepts was not as strong as the planning and service 
concept, so in 2004 MTI was declared bankrupt. This is clearly shown in the results of the 
quality assessment survey 2004. Also the score of Arriva is over time relatively good 
(above population mean). Except from HTM the services of the municipal companies GVB-
A, RET, GVU is not valued too high by passengers. Also the Connexxion group is not 
performing well on this item. It seems an overall trend that small companies are better able 
to react adequate on changing demands of customers than the big companies (for market 
share see appendix 1).This possible correlation will be investigated in more detail in later 
research by the authors. 
 
Table 7, Quality assessment,  
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Connexxion 6,67 6,55 6,74 7,03 
BBA Connex 6,99 6,76 6,86 7,17 
Arriva 6,80 6,81 6,98 7,20 
Hermes Connexxion 6,86 6,57 6,88 7,18 
Syntus 6,92 0,00 0,00 7,19 
Noordned Arriva 6,75 6,65 6,95 7,28 
Stadsvervoer Nederland     
Novio 7,26 6,69 6,74 7,25 
Limex (Connex)    7,42 
Taxicentrale Renesse     
GVB Amsterdam 6,85 6,55 6,87 6,91 
HTM 6,71 6,48 7,10 7,26 
GVU Utrecht 6,51 6,64 6,77 7,23 
RET Rotterdam 6,75 6,31 6,37 6,80 
Stadsbus Maastricht/Connex 6,74 6,92 6,98 7,37 
SVD (HTM) 7,39 6,87 6,76 7,52 
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Area (Maaskant)     
MTI 6,83 7,50 7,50 6,80 
Average 6,84 6,70 6,90 7,14 
standard deviation 1,98 1,14 1,07 1,46 
 
 
3.5 Cost recovery  
 
The data used for this research also contains revenue per year per concession area. 
Revenues added to the State subsidy granted to the PTA’s (only available for the year 
2003) results in an estimation of the total turn over in 2003 per PTA. Revue is exclusive of 
the revenue of the student contract that the Ministry of Education entered into the public 
transport operators1.  
 
Table 8, Turn over and cost recovery 2003 
 
State subsidy 
(€) 
revenue 
(€) 
estimated turn 
over (€) 
estimated Cost 
Recovery Ratio 
Groningen 34.977 18.384 53.361 34,5% 
Friesland 26.610 11.741 38.351 30,6% 
Drenthe 17.927 2.476 20.403 12,1% 
Overijssel 13.845 6.564 20.409 32,2% 
Regio Twente 17.240 5.607 22.847 24,5% 
Gelderland 37.517 14.411 51.928 27,8% 
KAN 43.396 20.887 64.283 32,5% 
Flevoland 21.573 11.837 33.410 35,4% 
Utrecht 9.535 12.260 21.795 56,3% 
BRU 64.453 28.605 93.058 30,7% 
Noord-Holland 43.630 23.282 66.912 34,8% 
ROA 261.098 141.364 402.462 35,1% 
Zuid-Holland 56.109 40.824 96.933 42,1% 
Stadsgewest 
Haagland 117.140 64.594 181.734 35,5% 
SRR 159.558 77.992 237.550 32,8% 
Zeeland 15.764 5.565 21.329 26,1% 
Noord-Brabant 53.562 19.537 73.099 26,7% 
SRE 23.232 9.239 32.471 28,5% 
Limburg 37.831 15.553 53.384 29,1% 
total 1.054.997 530.723 1.585.720 33,5% 
 
Average cost recovery is about 34% High cost recovery takes place in the region of 
Utrecht and Zuid-Holland. These are two relative high densely populated provinces. Cost 
recovery is low in Drenthe, which is a sparsely populated region. 
 
 
                                             
1 The total value of this student contract amounts for approximately € 112 mln. per year. The subdivision of this 
amount by concession areas and the PTA’s however is not known. 
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4 TENDERING IN THE NETHERLANDS, FACTS AND FIGURES 
4.1 Data used 
The direct aim of the research work of the authors is to get more insight in the effects of 
tendering and in the processes and reasons behind those effects. What conditions should 
be fulfilled for tendering to be successful? What organisational setting is mandatory? To 
answer these questions the authors formed and filled a dynamic data base, consisting of 
data of several public transport related topics for the years 2001-2006. Of course data for 
the latter years are not yet available. The data set consists of several parts: 
 passenger kilometres and fare box revenue, source: WROOV (demand) 
 vehicle hours, source RIG (supply) 
 passenger assessment of perceived public transport-quality, source: Klantenbarometer. 
 background variables such as incumbent operator, new operator, number of bids, type 
of contract,  incentive schemes et cetera. 
The authors processed the data and formatted it to the level of concession areas. 
 
WROOV: a large survey commissioned under responsibility of the Minister of V&W that is 
the basis for the subdivision of fare box revenues among operators. The revenues are 
exclusive of the revenues of the student contract and of para transit systems.  
RIG: based on the schedules (time tables) provided by the transit operators.  
RIG proceeds this data to travel information and makes it available for users via Internet 
and phone. The information units of the RIG data are public transport lines and public 
transport stops. Since public transport-lines cross concession boundaries, an assignment 
algorithm is developed by the authors. This algorithm assigns public transport supply 
according to the number of stops in a certain concession area. So the assignment method 
is bases on transportation principles rather than on administrative principles (i.e 
competency of PTA). The parameter derived from these data is vehicle hours per 
concession area and represents public transport-supply. Data of a representative week in 
November of each year is used. 
Klantenbarometer: a yearly survey in November among users of public transport asking 
passengers for their valuation of the trip they made. Some 30 quality items are surveyed 
and per year more than 80.000 respondents give their answers. The answers are scaled 
from 1 to 10 (1 bad, 10 excellent), hereby representing the Dutch education rating system.  
NB. Commercial relevant information is very hard to collect. Due to this we don’t possess 
direct financial figures, but were able to use proxies or derive such information from other 
sources.  
 
Concession areas and the competent PTA responsible for public transport in these areas 
fluctuate over time. Concession boundaries shift, concession responsibilities are transferred 
from one PTA to the other and concession areas are clustered. This variance in the basic 
research object (i.e. the concession) is dealt with by the authors by fixing the situation of 
concession boundaries and responsible PTA on the situation as of January 2004, the basis 
year. Data of others years is calculated back to this basis year. In 2004 74 concession 
areas are under the responsibility of 19 competent authorities. We clustered a few very 
small concession areas (Dutch isles) and use data of 71 concession areas. In appendix 2 a 
chart of the concession areas is included. The unit of tendering in most cases is 
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concession area. In some instances PTA did tender line concessions. These line 
concessions are not taken in to consideration in this research.  
 
4.2 Concessions described 
In the left most quadrant of the chart in appendix 3 the ex ante situation 2001 is rendered. 
Shown is the market share of transit companies by the 71 concessions. In table 9 the 
concession areas are divided according to their urban density. The overall majority of the 
concessions has a low density. Enclosed in the 9 concessions with a high density are the 
four main conurbation’s of the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and 
Utrecht). These concessions figure largely in this group because of the peculiarity that 
public transport in these concessions is exercised by a city owned municipal transit 
company . Although these high urbanised areas constitute only 13% of the total number of 
concessions, their importance is far bigger if expressed in passenger kilometres or vehicle 
hours.  
 
   Table 9, Typology of concessions 
 % concession 
areas 
number of 
concession areas
%passenger 
kilometres 
(2001) 
% vehicle hours 
(2004) 
urban density>2000 
inh./Sq. km 13% 9 38% 
 
34% 
urban density <1000-
2000> inh. /Sq. km 20% 14 16% 
 
15% 
urban density <1000 
inh./Sq. km 68% 48 46% 
 
51% 
total 100% 71 100% 100% 
 
With respect to tendered concessions, table 10 gives an overview. 
 
  Table 10, Current situation concessions tendered 
tendered in number of 
concessions 
% passenger km’s 
2004 (%) 
vehicle hours 
2004 (%) 
 
2002 
 
11 
 
15,5% 
 
6,2% 
 
10,0% 
 
2003 
 
8 
 
11,3% 
 
4,7% 
 
6,8% 
 
2004 
 
14 
 
19,7% 
 
20,0% 
 
25,8% 
 
2005 
 
11 
 
15,5% 
 
6,6% 
 
9,4% 
 
sub total 
 
44 
 
62% 
 
37,5% 
 
52% 
 
not (yet) tendered 
 
27 
 
38% 
 
62,5 % 
 
48% 
 
total 
 
71 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
The assignment to the year of tendering is the moment that the (new) operator starts 
operations. Since the operators need approximately half a year preparations time after 
granting the concession, at this moment in time already is known what the situation is end 
2005. End 2005 62% of the BTM concessions is tendered, representing 52% of the 
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number of vehicle hours (production). Vehicle hours can be interpreted as a proxy for turn 
over.  
 
The first round of concessions has mainly taken place in the more rural areas, as shown in 
table 11. 
 
  Table 11, Cases tendered by urban density 
 > 2000 
inh./Sq.km 
<1000-2000> 
inh./Sq.km 
< 1000 
inh./Sq.km 
total 
 
number of concessions 
 
9 
 
14 
 
48 
 
71 
tendered concessions 
2002-2005 
 
3 
 
8 
 
33 
 
44 
% 33,3% 57,1% 68,8% 62% 
 
 
4.3 Aims of Passengers Transit Act 2000  
Since the aim of the Passenger Law 2000 is based on the contestable market, in table 12 
the same figures are shown excluding the municipal transit companies (estimated yearly 
turn over € 0,9 billion). 
 
Table 12, Current situation non municipal concessions tendered  
tendered in number of 
concessions 
% passenger km’s 
2004 (%) 
vehicle hours 
2004 (%) 
 
2002 
 
11 
 
16,6% 
 
10,6% 
 
14,4% 
 
2003 
 
8 
 
12,1% 
 
8,1% 
 
9,7% 
 
2004 
 
13 
 
19,7% 
 
31,1% 
 
27,8% 
 
2005 
 
11 
 
16,6% 
 
11,3% 
 
13,5% 
 
sub total 
 
43 
 
65% 
 
61.2% 
 
65,4% 
 
not (yet) tendered 
 
23 
 
35% 
 
38,8 % 
 
34,6% 
 
total 
 
66 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
End of year 2005 65% of non municipal concessions representing 65% of turn over is 
tendered. Competent authorities expect to tender in 2006 11 more concessions. The 
expected outcome January 2007 is thus that 53 out of the 66 non municipal concessions 
will be tendered, representing 91% of vehicle hours (turn over). So the goal of the 
Government (100% of the contestable non municipal market tendered by January 1st 
2007) is within reach.  
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5 EFFECTS OF TENDERING 
In the previous chapter is mentioned that it very likely the aims of the Government with 
respect to the number of cases tendered (or the contestable turnover tendered) will be 
reached in the designated period of time. However tendering is no goal in itself but a 
means to reach a higher level goal, i.e. more passengers and a higher cost recovery. So 
lets look to these goals in more detail. 
 
For this purpose we defined a research group and a reference group. The research group 
consists of the tendered cases. The reference group is the group non tendered cases. The 
yearly number of cases in each of these groups varies. As from 2002 every year the 
tendered group will increase in size and the non tendered group decrease. This dynamic 
behaviour is from a research point of view hard to handle. We tackled this problem by 
defining strictly delineated groups of concessions and follow these groups over time by 
analysing a number of variables. The delineation we used is the first tender moment. So 
the group 2002 consists of the concessions that were publicly tendered in the calendar 
year 2002, and so forth and so on. The assignment of individual cases to a group is 
dependent on the instant of data collection.  
 
 
5.1 Primary effects 
We distinguish between primary and secondary effects of tendering. The primary effects 
are directly linked to the aims of Government, the secondary effects are underlaying. 
 
5.1.1 Public transport supply  
We analysed the trend in supply (vehicle hours).  
 
Table 13, Vehicle hours per week 
 
conc. 
tendered 
2002 
 
conc. 
tendered 
2003 
 
conc. 
tendered 
2004 
 
conc. 
tendered 
2005 
 
conc. not 
tendered 
2002-2005
all 
conces-
sions 
performance 2002 100 100 100 100 100 100 
performance 2003 105,23% 118,42% 97,91% 113,63% 106,14% 105,13% 
performance 2004 101,47% 122,88% 96,64% 111,82% 104,10% 103,52% 
 
Except from the concessions tendered in 2004, all concession show an increase in public 
transport supply in the years that are under research. Striking is the growth in supply for 
the concessions that were tendered in 2003 and 2005. They show a significantly higher 
BTM supply than the group concessions not tendered. We conclude from this and from 
detailed analysis of granted bids and contracts of specific tenders that tendering has a 
positive effect on supply. This effect is partly initiated by the PTA’s themselves. If PTA’s 
ask for more supply, operators encompass this in their bids and offer more supply (higher 
frequencies, longer operating hours etc.). 
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5.1.2 Passenger kilometres 
Did the extra supply lead to more public transport use?  
Illustration 3 and table 14 show passenger kilometres and fare box revenue per passenger 
kilometre for the 4 research groups and the reference group. The conclusion can be drawn 
that on this level of aggregation there is no significant difference between the group 
tendered concessions on the one hand and the group non tendered concessions on the 
other hand. The only exemption is the group concessions tendered in 2002. These 
concessions show a slight increase in patronage, but it not certain if this is caused by 
tendering. What we do see in all of the groups is the overall declining trend of patronage. 
A trend already described in chapter 1. It seems that the possible positive effect of 
tendering on public transport use is not strong enough to compensate for this overall trend. 
Because of de increase in fares the revenue per passenger kilometre is rising, however this 
has nothing to do with tendering. 
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Illustration 3, Public transport demand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14, Passenger kilometres 
 
conc. 
tendered 
2002 
 
conc. 
tendered 
2003 
 
conc. 
tendered 
2004 
 
conc. 
tendered 
2005 
 
conc. not 
tendered 
2002-2005
all conces-
sions 
performance 2001 100 100 100 100 100 100 
performance 2002 127,24% 95,72% 77,86% 63,98% 91,56% 87,66% 
performance 2003 117,31% 95,57% 79,03% 60,86% 95,80% 89,51% 
performance 2004 105,16% 84,52% 75,17% 57,51% 95,87% 87,16% 
 
5.1.3 Quality assessment 
Passengers using public transport value it every year by means of answering a survey. It is 
interesting to investigate whether there is a relation between quality assessment and 
tendering of concessions. PTA’s put their wishes and demands for the level of service in 
their terms of requirements. Through these terms PTA’s try to mediate between the needs 
of the passengers they represent (and who don’t have direct access to operators) and 
public transport operators. In real world however PTA’s don’t know exactly what 
passengers want, and besides, the passenger does not exist. It is a amorphous group of 
individuals with multiple –and often conflicting- wishes and demands. So to diminish 
uncertainty PTA’s that are not familiar with the instrument and procedures of tendering, 
require extra supply. We noticed that these requirements were fulfilled by the operators 
(more vehicle hours), but noticed also that passengers apparently have other preferences. 
Everywhere in Europe this trend is recognisable: in the first round of tendering the strategy 
is set on getting more supply. In the following tenders PTA’s steer more on quality 
aspects.  
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Table 15, Quality assessment of BTM use by passengers 
 
conc. 
tendered 
2002 
 
conc. 
tendered 
2003 
 
conc. 
tendered 
2004 
 
conc. 
tendered 
2005 
 
conc. not 
tendered 
2002-2005 
all conces-
sions 
performance 2001 6,94 6,85 6,81 6,78 6,66 6,58 
performance 2002 6,84 6,65 6,65 6,71 6,50 6,63 
performance 2003 6,99 6,94 6,88 7,06 6,63 6,56 
performance 2004 7,22 7,24 7,21 7,16 6,94 7,11 
 
In table 15 the overall average assessment –result of an average of some 30 quality items- 
is rendered. For all groups of concessions the customer appreciation stays approximately 
the same. The steep rise in 2004 probably this has something to do with a change in 
survey method. 
 
The group concessions tendered in 2002 experienced two years in the ex ante situation 
(after tendering). Effects of tendering must be first of all become tangible in this group. 
Relatively –compared to 2001- the group concessions that is tendered in 2001 performs 
slightly better than the group concessions not tendered. The significance of this difference 
related to the tendering process is subject to ongoing research of the authors. 
 
The Klantenbarometer survey also gives valuable insight in significance and assessment of 
underlying quality factors.  
Although it has no direct link with the effects of tendering we give some results here.  
 
Table 16, Assessment quality elements 2004 
 
 
quality elements of the trip 
Average 
assessment 
2004 
(rate 10= most 
positive) 
Percentage 
respondents 2004 
that value an item 
high priority for 
improvements. 
significance 2004 
(%) 
boarding/getting of 8,12 1,6% 7,2 
ease of buying tickets 7,84 1,8% 7,0 
customer friendliness 7,15 2,2% 8,3 
driving quality  6,99 2,9% 9,5 
ease of finding a seat 8,50 3,4% 6,3 
information on stops 7,04 4,0% 5,1 
noise in vehicle 6,00 5,7% 5,0 
cleanness of vehicle 6,58 6,1% 6,8 
reliability time table 6,90 7,7% 11,2 
frequency/interval 6,54 12,8% 15,7 
information in case of delay 4,35 22,7% 5,0 
fare 4,54 25,5% 2,8 
 
 
Overall the aggregate priorities and the average quality assessments do correspond with 
each other. High valued items do get in lesser extent a high priority than less valued items. 
The Spearman rank correlation therefore is high (-0,89). Price is mentioned most as item 
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that has to be improved, followed by information. This outcome is consistent with other 
research on the importance on reduction of uncertainty by means of providing travel 
information. The items mentioned less are improvements of boarding and getting out. This 
seems logical since in most of the ToR of the PTA’s demands for low floor rolling stocked 
are set. In future Terms of Requirements more emphasis should be put on reliability, 
information and fare. With the introduction of the chip card in 2007 it is possible for PTA’s 
and operators to use differentiated fares.  
 
5.1.4 Cost recovery 
We concluded that the first aim of the Passengers Transport Law (increase in patronage) is 
not (yet?) fulfilled. How about the second goal, enhancing cost recovery? Already 
mentioned is that is very hard to collect financial data. The only financial data we were 
able to collect is used for an estimation of the cost recovery ratio per PTA in 2003. 
We expect the efficiency parameter ‘number of passenger kilometres per vehicle hour’ is 
correlated to cost recovery. This assumption is tested on the data for 2003. The result is a 
R of 0.4537, meaning a rather strong positive correlation.  
In the analysis described in this chapter the parameter ‘passenger kilometres per vehicle 
hour’ is used as a proxy for cost recovery. 
 
 
Table 17, Efficiency , number of passenger kilometres per vehicle hour (absolute figures)  
 
all cases 
 
tendered in 
2002 
tendered in 
2003 
tendered in 
2004 
tendered in 
2005 
not tendered
 
performance 2002 276,9 201,3 258,9 206,5 232,4 344,0 
performance 2003 268,9 176,4 218,3 214,1 194,5 339,1 
performance 2004 265,9 164,0 186,0 206,3 186,8 346,0 
 
 
 
Table 18, Efficiency , number of passenger kilometres per vehicle hour (relative)  
 
all cases 
 
tendered in 
2002 
tendered in 
2003 
tendered in 
2004 
tendered in 
2005 
not tendered
 
performance 2002 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
performance 2003 97,13% 63,70% 78,84% 77,32% 70,26% 122,47% 
performance 2004 96,05% 59,22% 67,19% 74,50% 67,48% 124,96% 
 
 
Overall efficiency is declining from 2002 on to 2004. This is not unexpected since we 
already ascertained that demand is falling and supply rising. However the trend in the 
tendered cases is not distinct from that. On the contrary, the concession tendered in 2002 
are performing even worse.  
However, it is very hard to reach a sound conclusion on cost recovery with respect to 
tendering. It is after all possible that the extra supply the companies offer bring no extra 
costs or expenditures to the PTA’s. In other words they get more supply for the same (and 
sometime even less) money. The data in the used data set is not detailed enough to get 
prove of this possibility. However consequential indications confirm this trend (for instance 
this was the case in the tendered concessions ‘t Gooi, Haarlem-IJmond en Almere. Also 
the mid term evaluation of the Passenger Law 2000, reports in the tendered cases a 
decline of the average cost of a vehicle hour of 7%, Berenschot, 2004). 
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5.2 Secondary effects 
5.2.1 Planning function 
In earlier work of the authors (Mouwen, 2003.) a number of regulative regimes is defined. 
One of these regimes is public tendering. In that regime government has to define the 
terms of requirements for a service. There are three types of tendering: 
(a) operational franchise: government owns both infrastructure and rolling stock and 
gives these assets in loan to the operator who only has operational risks. In this 
regime government has the initiative. It makes it possible for government to level 
market barriers by preventing sunk cost to become a barrier for entrance to the 
market.  
(b) exclusive concessions: potential public transport-operators have to compete for 
the exclusive right to operate that service for a given period of time. After the 
tendering a temporarily monopoly exists. Companies that subscribe for the 
concession can be either private or public.  
(c) granting non-exclusive concessions. In that case more than one (but a limited 
number) operator acquires the right to operate a certain service for a given period. 
Customers have freedom to choose between either operators2, 
In the Netherlands it was decided that type (b) had to be implemented. To give more 
substance to the regimes, in table 1 they are specified at three layers. These are the layers 
where managerial freedom exposes itself: 
1. Strategic level: the topics on this level concern policy definition and decision making. 
At this level the objectives of public transport and global definition of the network is 
defined.  
2. Tactical level: based on the objectives where the level of service (operations) is 
defined, including the accompanying assets such as vehicles, personnel et cetera 
3. Operational level: operations itself, tariff collection and sales et cetera 
 It is quite clear that function 1 belongs to the responsibilities of government (in Holland 
the regional PTA’s) and function 3 to the operators. Not only in the Netherlands, but all 
over Europe ongoing discussion takes place concerning the responsibilities on the tactical 
level (see for instance Isotope, 1997 and Maretope, 2002). The Transport Law 2000 
states that public transport is a market where operators have to get freedom of action so 
to produce products and services that meet the demands of passengers and it that way 
acquire passengers. Freedom of movement on the tactical level is of utmost importance for 
positioning the public transport products. On that level fares are defined, network and 
routes are planned and the level of service is defined. Because of the regime chosen in the 
Netherlands the competent regional authority has the overall responsibility and therefore 
decides whether the planning function is positioned with the operator or with the PTA 
itself.  
 
As part of the mid term evaluation of the Passenger Transport Law 2000 (Berenschot, 
2004) the positioning of the planning function is researched. In more than 81% of the 
tendered cases the planning function rests with the PTA. So this is in clear contrast with 
                                             
2 In real world public transport this regime does not exist very often, so in the empirical section this regime is 
omitted 
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the intention of the Law. Remarkable is that in the control group of not tendered cases 
only 65% of the PTA practise the planning function. Reasons for this behaviour are: 
 If the contract is allocated without tendering, PTA have more freedom to negotiate 
with the PTO on the level of service 
 Risk averse conduct of PTA’s. Especially in the first tenders PTA’s are not sure what 
the outcome of the competition and tender process will be and seek certainty in 
defining product specifications them selves.  
PTA’s that practise the planning function themselves need to specify product definitions 
and specifications in detail. This results in a detailed Terms of Requirements that leave 
hardly any room for creativeness of suppliers/operators. This way of acting of PTA’s on 
the other hand facilitates the process of assessment of the proposals. This model of input 
oriented control is confronted in illustration 4 with the extreme opposite, namely output 
oriented steering.  
 
 
 
Illustration 4, Two models of control 
 
 
In the period after the mid term evaluation research, the authors witnessed an ongoing 
trend for competent authorities to perform the planning function themselves.  
Forthcoming in depth research of the authors compares in detail a number of cases, that 
differ in the positioning of planning activities and try to link that to the outcome of the 
tendering process. 
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5.2.2 Allocation of risks 
The allocation of risks between the operator (OP) and the Responsible Authority (PTA) is 
analysed. The PTA has to decide on how to allocate the division of the risks associated 
with public transport between the OP and the PTA itself. There are two main risks 
associated with public transport, i.e. risks concerning operating costs and risks concerning 
revenues. The allocation of risks is formalised in a contract between the OP and the PTA. 
We distinguish in this respect three types of contracts (see table 19). 
 
Table 19, Types of contracts and allocation of risks 
contract type management contract gross cost contract3 net cost contract4 
risks PTA OP PTA OP PTA OP 
costs X   X  X 
revenues X  X   X 
 
In the situation that the operator bears the risk of revenue, the operator is stimulated to 
improve the quality of service thereby increase fare box revenue and thus make more 
profit.  
Results of the mid term evaluation (Berenschot, 2004) showed that in 75% of the 
concessions tendered revenue risks are the responsibility of operators (net cost contracts). 
In the non tendered concessions this is 65%. The authors witnessed in the period of time 
after the mid term evaluation a trend that more and more PTA’s take the revenue risk back 
(gross cost contracts). This seems not logical but is consistent with the perceived trend of 
more control over the planning function of PTA’s.  
 
6 MARKET ACCESS  
In this chapter market access is put central. We shed light on the aspect whether the 
Dutch BTM market is really an open market. 
 
6.1 Total BTM market 
In the pre tender phase (before 2002) the market in the Netherlands is dominated by only a 
few players. The regional market is dominated by the Connexxion Holding, the big 
municipal markets by the municipal companies. In 2001 Connexxion –directly or by means 
of their subsidiaries possessed 50 out of the 71 concession areas.  
 
Upon mid 2005 44 BTM concessions where tendered. Ten (10) out of these 44 
concessions shifted from the incumbent operator to another new company. Does this imply 
that competition is vivid? The answer to this question is negative. PTA’s have in practise 
relative little choice. In the greater part of the cases (more than 80%) only the three big 
contenders did place a bid. These already existing ‘ABC companies’ (Arriva, BBA/Connex, 
Connexxion) share the market. Until now no foreign new operator has entered the 
contestable market. Also hardly any competition from adjacent sectors such as taxi or 
coach operators occurred. In some instances the combination of SVN (Novio, HTM and 
                                             
3 also called minimum cost contract 
4 also called minimum subsidy contract 
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Volker Wessel (private engineers) appears on the market. But till now they managed to win 
only one concession (Utrecht Oost). The taxi operator TCR managed to win the bid of the 
very small concession of the northern isle Vlieland. The newcomer from native soil MTI is 
already bankrupt. 
 
Hopefully after 2007 the number of Dutch players will increase because from that moment 
on the municipal companies may compete for a concession outside their own municipality.  
 
In table 20 and illustration 5 aggregated market shares are presented. In appendix 1 and 3 
the shares for all companies are included.  
 
Table 21, Market shares, total market 
 passenger kilometres vehicle hours 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
Conexxion group 41,4% 42,9% 40,5% 38,3% 42,8% 41,2% 41,3% 
Municipal companies 37,1% 38,1% 39,2% 41,8% 32,8% 30,6% 30,4% 
Other regional companies 21,5% 19,0% 20,3% 19,9% 24,5% 28,3% 28,2% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 5, Market share Connexxion dominant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Contestable BTM market 
The Minister defines the contestable market as the market without the municipal 
companies. On the contestable market the share of the Connexxion Holding is diminishing 
but still considerable (60% in 2004). In absolute terms on the contestable BTM market 
Connexxion loses between 2004 and 202 3,4% points market share in passenger 
kilometres. Measured in production volume the picture is less dramatic.  
 
Table 22, market share, contestable market 
 passenger kilometres vehicle hours 
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 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
Connexxion group 65,9% 69,3% 66,6% 65,9% 63,6% 59,3% 59,4% 
Other regional companies 34,1% 30,7% 33,4% 34,1% 36,4% 40,7% 40,6% 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
 
 
Furthermore it is striking that Connexxion loses market share especially in the first years of 
tendering. Probably the company was not fit to market conditions and the different 
demands that were imposed on her organisational structure. The learning curve of 
Connexxion however is steep. In this first years the bids were accounted for under the 
responsibility of the regional Connexxion -directors. In the latter years the Holding took 
over this work and formed a specialised tender team that assists the regional teams. This 
did work much better: the Connexxion concessions that came on the market in 2004 
(Connexxion is incumbent) were all kept by Connexxion.  
 
Market share of CXX in vehicle hours (proxy for turn over) declines from 69,3% in 2002 to 
59,4% in 2004. However conspicuous is the observation -if the definition of contestable 
market by central Government is used (i.e. excluding the municipal market)- that the 
Connexxion Group still holds more than 50% market share, and therefore in the definition 
of NMa (Regulative body) has a dominant market position that may hinder competition. In 
the next chapter we come back to that. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper we evaluated ten new legislation on public transport and especially those 
articles of the Law that are aimed at enforcing competition by means of tendering of 
concession areas. Evaluation at this moment in time can not be conclusive. The 
experiences with this new instrument are to short for that. However at this moment some 
preliminary conclusions can be drawn and some suggestions for further research 
postulated.  
 
Customers 
It seems an if small companies are better able to react adequate on changing demands of 
customers than the big ones. The average customers assessment of perceived quality for 
the small ones is relative good. 
 
Government goals 
End of year 2005 65% of non municipal concessions representing 65% of turn over is 
tendered. Competent authorities expect to tender in 2006 11 more concessions. The 
expected outcome January 2007 is thus that 53 out of the 66 non municipal concessions 
will be tendered, representing 91% of  vehicle hours (turn over). The goal of the 
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Government (100% of the contestable non municipal market tendered by January 1st 
2007)  is within reach.   
 
Striking is the growth in supply for the concessions that were tendered in 2003 and 2005. 
They show a significantly higher BTM supply than the group concessions not tendered. We 
conclude from this and from detailed analysis of granted bids and contracts of specific 
tenders that tendering has a positive effect on supply. This effect is partly initiated by the 
PTA’s themselves. If PTA’s ask for more supply, operators encompass this in their bids 
and offer more supply (higher frequencies, longer operating hours etc.).  
So supply is rising due to tendering. However demand is constantly falling in almost all 
cases (even the tendered ones). So it seems that the possible positive effect of tendering 
on public transport use is not strong enough to compensate for this overall declining trend.  
 
Operators 
Because of falling demand and rising supply, overall efficiency is declining from 2002 
onwards.  
 
Upon mid 2005 44 BTM concessions where tendered. Ten (10) out of these 44 
concessions shifted from the incumbent operator to another new company. This does 
however not imply that competition is vivid. PTA’s have in practise relative little choice. In 
the greater part of the cases (more than 80%) only the three already existing big 
contenders did place a bid.  
 
On the regional market the share of the former monopolist Connexxion declined from 
69,3% in 2002 to 59,4% in 2004. The question is whether this is a dominant market 
position. Ongoing research of the authors focus on bottlenecks for market access. They  
investigate inter alia the existence of economies of scale, inclusive of what is the optimal 
size of concession areas and information asymmetry between PTA’s and operators. 
 
Finally the authors recommend that the effects of tendering are kept under close 
monitoring. 
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Appendix 1, Detailed figures per operator 
 
 
Passenger kilometres 
 
 
market share 
(veh.hr) 
 
Vehicle hours 
 
Quality assessment 
 
 
Efficiency(pass.km’s/ve
h. hr.) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
Connexxion 1855297160 1658530565 1611906696 1475101892 35,6% 
11112
0 112851 111773 6,67 6,55 6,74 7,03 298,5 285,7 263,9 
BBA Connex 267741917 221900504 240193722 225631692 8,1% 24399 25514 25385 6,99 6,76 6,86 7,17 181,9 188,3 177,8 
Arriva 408400898 300322088 339792654 328444004 10,7% 26449 34370 33692 6,80 6,78 6,98 7,20 227,1 197,7 195,0 
Hermes Connexxion 131106584 141569077 125092808 125594403 5,8% 18611 18468 18081 6,86 6,57 6,88 7,18 152,1 135,5 138,9 
Syntus 95669811 81425924 78241423 71463155 2,1% 4015 5547 6534 6,92 0,00 0,00 7,19 405,7 282,1 218,8 
Noordned Arriva 90398480 75176815 71400030 76535483 1,9% 4380 6119 5878 6,75 6,65 6,95 7,28 343,2 233,4 260,4 
Stadsvervoer Nederland 0 0 0 0 0,0% 0 0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00    
Novio 125448414 76829408 76858440 65883176 2,4% 7769 7892 7473 7,26 6,69 6,74 7,25 197,8 194,8 176,3 
Limex (Connex) 0 0 19539949 19130223 0,4% 0 1261 1237 0,00 0,00 0,00 7,42  310,0 309,4 
Taxicentrale Renesse 0 0 0 0 0,0% 0 0 0        
GVB Amsterdam 728708424 657774349 704928263 704419975 12,8% 39719 39053 40284 6,85 6,55 6,87 6,91 331,2 361,0 349,7 
HTM 314961452 285223515 304764139 302421634 6,5% 27308 21268 20349 6,71 6,48 7,10 7,26 208,9 286,6 297,2 
GVU Utrecht 116786416 116534923 107215073 104788372 4,5% 9958 14374 14048 6,51 6,64 6,77 7,23 234,1 149,2 149,2 
RET Rotterdam 615884708 542456663 566233001 634685812 6,7% 22410 22795 20912 6,75 6,31 6,37 6,80 484,1 496,8 607,0 
Stadsbus Maastricht/Connex 22897577 25996610 24082922 25077795 1,3% 3921 4084 4096 6,74 6,92 6,98 7,37 132,6 117,9 122,5 
SVD (HTM) 19018079 16741923 16363243 16069971 0,8% 2670 2916 2609 7,39 6,87 6,76 7,52 125,4 112,2 123,2 
Area (Maaskant) 0 0 0 0 0,0% 0 0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00    
MTI 0 439350 2995592 1716057 0,6% 734 2504 1779  7,50 7,50 6,80 12,0 23,9 19,3 
Totaal 4792319919 4200921714 4289607954 4176963643 100,0% 
30346
2 319016 314128 6,80 6,60 6,90 7,10 276,9 268,9 265,9 
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Appendix 2 
Competent authorities, 2004 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operators, situation Jan. 1st. Operators, situation Jan. 1st. 
Operators, situation Jan. 1st. Operators, situation Jan. 1st. 2005 
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